The security of the previous quantum key distribution (QKD) 
Introduction
Since the first finding that quantum effects may protect privacy information transmitted in an open quantum channel by S.Wiesner [1] , and then by C.H.Bennett and G.Brassard [2] , a remarkable surge of interest in the international scientific and industrial community has propelled quantum cryptography into mainstream computer science and physics.
Furthermore, quantum cryptography is becoming increasingly practical at a fast pace.
Several quantum key distribution protocols have been proposed, three main protocols of these are the BB84 protocol [3] , B92 protocol [4] , and EPR protocol [5] . The first quantum key distribution prototype, working over a distance of 32 centimetres in 1989, was implemented by means of laser transmitting in free space [6] . Soon, several experimental demonstrations by optical fibre were set up [7] . After that, a lot of publications have been presented, which cover three aspects: 1) QKD protocols [8] [9] [10] , 2) security of QKD protocols and detection of eavesdropper [11] [12] [13] [14] [15] [16] and 3) practical application of quantum cryptography [17] [18] [19] [20] .
A further elegant technique has been proposed by Ekert [5] , which relies on the violation of the Bell inequalities to provide the secret security. And the third technique, devised by Bennett [4] , is based on the transmission of nonorthogonal quantum states.
However, the cryptography and the cryptanalytics are always a pairs contradiction.
Once a cryptographic protocol is proposed, eavesdropper (Eve) will try to break it. Quantum cryptography is also no exception, although the quantum cryptography is thought to be provably security. With the quantum key distribution protocols presented, several attacks strategy have been proposed, such as intercept/resend scheme [6] , beamsplitting scheme [6] , entanglement scheme [14] and quantum copying [15, 16] . In the intercept/resend scheme, Eve intercepts selected light pulses and reads them in bases of her choosing. When this occurs, Eve fabricates and sends to Bob a pulse of the same polarization as she detected. However, due to uncertainty principle, at least 25% of the pulse Eve fabricates will yield the wrong result if later successfully measured by Bob. The other attack, beamsplitting, depends on the fact that transmitted light pulses are not pure single-photon states. In the entanglement scheme, Eve involves the carrier particle in an interaction with her own quantum system, referred to as probe, so that the particle and the probe are left in an entangled state, and a subsequent measurement of the probe yields information about the particle. Some investigators are now turning their attention to collective attacks and joint attacks. About these attacks description please see Ref. [13] and its references. Eve can also use the quantum copying to obtain information between Alice and Bob. Two kind quantum copies are presented [15, 16] . It is appropriate to emphasize the limitation of above attacks strategy. All these mentioned attacks strategy are restricted by the uncertainty principle or the quantum corrections, so Eve can not break the quantum cryptography protocols. The risk of eavesdropper is to disturb the information and to be detected finally by the legitimate users. This is the reason why quantum cryptography is declared to be provably secure.
However, The security of the previous quantum key distribution protocols, which is guaranteed by the nature of physics law, is based on the legitimate users. In practice, the impersonation of Alice or Bob by eavesdropper will be existed in a large probability.
Circumventing the impersonation needs to verify the identity of communicators, saying Alice and Bob.
In section 2 we give the preliminary ingredients, which are important quantum effects in quantum cryptography. Section 3 reviews the QKD protocols. In section 4 we propose a QKD protocol with authentication function. It is composed of two phases, i.e., the initial phase and QKD with authentication phase. In section 5 we analyze the security of the presented scheme. We conclude in section 6.
Preliminaries
The recent results in quantum cryptography are associated with the Heisenberg uncertainty principle of quantum mechanics, EPR effects. In follows, we briefly describe these quantum effects.
Heisenberg Uncertainty Principle
Using standard Dirac notation, this principle can be succinctly stated as follows: 
EPR effect and Bell's Theorem
Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen (EPR) effect play an important role in quantum information In 1964, Bell [22] gave a means for actually testing for locally hidden variable theories.
He proved that all such locally hidden variable theories must satisfy the Bell inequality.
Quantum mechanics has been shown to violate the inequality.
Bell's theorem provides a method for checking eavesdropping. In following we give a brief reviews. For convenience, we explain Bell's theorem with spin-
particle pairs.
Consider two measurable quantities A and B, and label the (discrete) possible values of
A and B by α i and β j , the corresponding unit vectors are a i ,and b j , respectively. Then
where P ±± (a i , b j ) denotes the probability that result ±1 has been obtained along a i and ±1 along b j . The correlation coefficient S is obtained
According to quantum rules
So, quantum mechanics requires
Intervention of eavesdropper induces
where n a , n b are two unit vectors (for particles a, and b, respectively), ρ(n a , n b ) is the probability of intercepting a spin component along a given direction for a particular measurement. In this case,
By the correlation coefficients, the legitimate user may detect the eavesdropper.
Quantum key distribution protocols
A lot of QKD protocols have been presented, they have similar procedure. The legitimate communicators, known as Alice and Bob, communicate over a public channel in following phases. step 1 is dedicated to raw key extraction, step 2 to error estimation, step 3 to checking eavesdropping, step 4 to reconciliation, i.e., to reconciled key extraction, and step 5 to privacy amplification, i.e., extraction of final secret key.
Step 1. Quantum transmission over quantum communication channel
The communicators set up a quantum channel, then they transmit quantum states (Qubits) over the quantum channel. It is noted that the transmission model is different for different QKD protocol. Two typical transmission are BB84 protocol and EPR protocol.
The former transmits non-commute quantum states, and the latter transmits one of each EPR pairs
Step 2. Extraction of raw key over a public channel
After Alice and Bob obtain what is call the raw data by the quantum transmission, the raw data must be sifted because it consists of those bits which Bob either did not receive at all or did not correctly measure in the basis used to transmit them. Such "non-receptions" could be caused by Eve's intrusion or by dark counts in Bob's detecting device. The location of the dark counts are, of course, communicated by Bob to Alice over the public channel. By comparison publicly the basis between Alice and Bob, the data sifting procedure is completed.
Step 3. Check of eavesdropper This step depends on the different QKD protocols. In BB84 protocol, Alice and Bob now use the public channel to estimate the error rate in raw key. They publicly select and agree upon a random sample of raw key, publicly compare these bits to obtain an estimate R of the error-rate. These revealed bits are discarded from raw key. If R exceeds a certain threshold R Max , then it will be impossible for Alice and Bob to arrive at a common secret key. If so, Alice and Bob return to stage 1 to start over. On the other hand, If the error estimate R does not exceed R Max , then Alice and Bob move onto phase 3. In EPR protocol, one may use the correction of EPR pairs to check eavesdropping.
Step 4. Extraction of reconciled key Stage 1 is repeated, i.e., a random permutation is chosen, remnant raw key is partitioned into blocks of length , parities are compared, etc. This is done until it becomes inefficient to continue in this fashion.
Alice and Bob then move to stage 2 by using a more refined reconciliation procedure.
They publicly select randomly chosen subsets of remnant raw key, publicly compare parities, each time discarding an agreed upon bit from their chosen key sample. If a parity
should not agree, they employ the binary search strategy of step 1 to locate and delete the error.
Finally, when, for some fixed number N of consecutive repetitions of stage 2, no error is found, Alice and Bob assume that to a very high probability, the remnant raw key is without error. Alice and Bob now rename the remnant raw key reconciled key, and move on to the final and last phase of their communication.
Step
Privacy amplification
Alice and Bob now have a common reconciled key which they know is only partially secret from Eve. They now begin the process of privacy amplification, which is the extraction of a secret key from a partially secret one [23] .
By the distillation art of secret key, the so called privacy amplification, a final secure quantum key is generated and distributed. The basic principle of privacy amplification is as follows. Let Alice and Bob shared a random variable W , such as a random n-bit string, while an eavesdropper Eve learns a corrected random variable V , providing at most t < n bits of information about W , i.e., H(W |V ) ≤ n − t. Eve is allowed to specify an arbitrary distribution P V W (unknown to Alice and Bob) subject to the only constraint that Eve's average information about the final secret key is less than 2 −s /ln2 bits.
The drawback of previous QKD protocols
Obviously, the above procedure is based on the legitimate users, refereed to as Alice and Bob can not simultaneously complete the identity verification and quantum key distribution, Eve may avoid the authentication procedure. So, practically, QKD protocol with identity verification is necessary. In the follows, we improve the previous quantum key distribution scheme to guarantee the security of quantum key for truly legitimate users.
QKD protocol with identity verification
Follows we propose a scheme to implement quantum authentication in QKD protocol. It may be implemented by non-commute quantum states or non-orthogonal quantum states with Heisenberg uncertainty principle. It also can be implement by EPR pairs associated with Bell's theorem. In this paper, we use EPR pair with the Bell's theorem to implement quantum authentication. Both the identity verification and quantum key distribution are used in our proposed secure authentication protocol. There are two phase in the quantum authentication protocol. The initial phase is completed at the key information center to set up the system. and the authentication phase is executed between the two communication parties to achieve mutual authentication and exchange the secure quantum key.
Initial Phase
Assuming the information center is legitimate and believable. The information center is responsible neither for mutual authentication nor for the generation of quantum keys.
The role of this center is to simply help the legitimate user to obtain the authentication key. In initial phase, we use the Biham's technology [24] . It uses the quantum memory, about the implementation of qubit in quantum memory may refer to reference [24] . In fact, the communicators and the center are composed of a network. When the secure network system is setting up, the information center will execute the following steps. 2. Alice and Bob respectively prepare EPR pairs, and send respectively one of the each EPR pairs to the center.
3. Check eavesdropping between Alice and the center, and between Bob and the center.
The center randomly chooses qubits from the strings sent by Alice and Bob, and checks the correction of quantum states like in EPR protocol.
4. The center must be able to keep the quantum states for a while ( in case the states do not arrive at the same time from Alice and Bob) and then measures the eigenvalue of the total-spin operator of the first pair, the second pair. etc. Except for the qubits for detection of eavesdropping.
5. The center tells Alice and Bob the result of the measurement. Once the legitimate users obtain the authentication keys K 1 , the information center is not needed in further communication between Alice and Bob.
Authentication phase
Step 1 M is like that in EPR protocol.
Step 4. Alice and Bob check the eavesdropper. For secure communication, the legitimates users Alice and Bob need to firstly detect eavesdropper. Bob randomly chooses some measurement results measured by the basis M for checking the correction of EPR pair. According to the Bell's theorem described in subsection 2.2 to judge the eavesdropping.
Step 5. Bob encrypts his results measured by M K 1 . Although Bob does not know the qubits measured by Alice, it will not influence the identity verification. Expressing the strings of quantum states for authentication by
Where |ψ i > represents a qubit received by Bob. After measurement, Bob obtains
where |Φ >= {|φ 1 >, |φ 2 >, · · · , |φ n >} represents the measurement results under mea-
Transferring |Φ > into binary bits strings m, and then using K 1 to encrypt it, Bob obtains the ciphertext
Bob sends Alice the ciphertext y, and tells Alice the corresponding sequence numbers of quantum states |ψ i >, i = 1, 2, · · · , n.
Step 5. Verifying Bob's identity. Having received Bob's results, Alice analyzes Bob's results. Alice decrypts the ciphertext,
and compare her results with m, thereby Alice gets the measurement basis M Kt . If K t = K 1 , Bob's identity is true.
Step 6 Verifying Alice' identity. After Alice decrypted the ciphertext, Alice sends Bob the result m . If m = m, the Alice's identity is true.
Step 7. Alice and Bob distribute the quantum secret key. If the communicators are legitimate, Alice and Bob distribute the quantum secret key using the remainder Qubits.
The process is same as EPR protocol.
Step 8. Alice and Bob discard the authentication keys K 1 , and set up new authentication keys. After authentication, the authentication key K 1 is no longer use. The legitimate users obtain a new authentication key. The method is like that used in QKD protocol. Of course, one can directly take portion bits from the final quantum key as the authentication key.
It has been noted that the presented protocol can not prevent voluntary attack. This is a drawback of quantum cryptography. How to prevent the voluntary attack needs further investigation.
The proposed QKD protocol with authentication is provably secure. Obviously, the QKD is provably secure because we use the previous QKD protocol. So in following, we mainly analyze the security of authentication scheme. In initial phase, the security derives from the security of the EPR protocol, and relies on the fact that the singlet state is the only state for which the two spins are anticorrelated both inŜ z and in theŜ x basis. So eavesdropper and the center can not obtain the authentication key K 1 .
In authentication phase, we believe this scheme is secure as the follows reason. i) Our protocol does not have the conspiracy problem of masquerading. If a forger wants to masquerade user Alice or Bob to communicate with others, he must find the common key. However, it is difficult to obtain the shared common secret because of the follows two reasons. First, the authentication key is obtained by the quantum key distribution protocol which is provably secure, so the authentication key is secure. Second the authentication key is used only one times, eavesdropper does not know any information about the authentication key.
ii) The replay-attack will also not succeed in our protocol because the key is used only one times. iii) The quantum attacking strategy is invalid, the reason is the same as the analysis for previous QKD protocols.
There is a weakness in our protocol. The only weakness of our protocol is the reservation of authentication key. Although the obtaining of the common key in the last quantum communication is provably secure, the common key reservation has not circumvented the catch 22 problem. In fact, this drawback exists in all symmetric cryptographic authentication system. Of course, we can use the EPR effects or other quantum effect to keep the common key, but the reservation time is very short according to current technology.
A long time correction of quantum states is need in the future.
Conclusion
The previous QKD protocols are based on the legitimate users. However, the practical existence of impersonation of Alice or Bob by eavesdropper, make us have to take some action to against the eavesdropper, an efficient way is to verify the communicators' identity. Unfortunately, there is no known way to initiate authentication without initially exchanging secret key over a secure communication channel in previous protocols.
Of course, one can use the classic authentication protocol to verify identity. However, because the authentication and the QKD can not be simultaneous, Eve can escape the authentication procedure. In addition, quantum key distribution protocol is completely insecurity under the attacking of middle-attack.
In this paper, we proposed a QKD protocol that can simultaneously distribute the quantum secret key and verify the communicators' identity. The QKD is implemented by the previous EPR protocol, the authentication is implemented by the symmetric cryptographic scheme with quantum effects. The presented scheme is provably secure.
we use EPR effects with Bell' theorem to implement quantum authentication. It can prevent impersonation and middle-attack. Of course, it can also be implemented by noncommute quantum states or non-orthogonal quantum states with Heisenberg uncertainty principle.
